Osman Yıldırım, Lund University
Executive Summary
Syrian refugees are deemed as overt point of contention in Turkey politics since 2011 Syrian civil war. As there has been incremental influx of Syrian to Turkey from this period, ongoing debate about their presence and status determine the domestic politics intermittently. Turkey’s hosting of over 3 million registered Syrian refugees, and even more when accounting for unregistered individuals, has brought about societal unrest and challenges of refugees’ daily lives. The othering rhetoric toward refugees, often expressed by different segments of society in Turkey, has turned refugees into tools of political discourse and has led to direct and violent attacks. While facing xenophobic attitudes, refugees have become an essential part of the labor market, particularly in low-wage sectors. Grappling with precarious working conditions and marginalization, refugees’ desire to return to Syria following the fall of Assad has created ambivalence, given the instability in Syria and their already established livelihoods in Turkey.
Refugees are not the only cohort experiencing a critical duality; the Turkish government has also long pursued contradictory refugee policies. While the government promotes repatriation programs, particularly following the regime change in Syria, its simultaneous embrace of all refugees through Islamic rhetoric creates dual policy for political power in Turkey. This duality creates ambiguity, normalizes violent attacks against refugees, and exacerbates unrest within society. Thus, it is urgent and essential for the Turkish government to take action to prevent further potential chaos in the country. This includes formalizing employment conditions for refugees to promote integration and protect workers’ rights, preventing new illegal crossings to reduce reliance on cheap labor, and ceasing interventions such as military operations for regional stability. In this regard, this policy paper is structured as follows: it first provides a broad background of the issue, followed by policy recommendations and implications. The paper also draws on insights gained from fieldwork observations and interviews.
Background
Examining the underlying causes of the Turkish government’s political ambivalence and the class-based ambivalence experienced by refugees provides comprehensive insights for shaping policy recommendations for the Turkish government. In this regard, the working conditions and legal status of refugees, along with public xenophobia, are critical matters to address. The high demand for cheap labor in industries has pushed refugees into low-paid, informal jobs. Thus, Syrian labor has been utilized to address labor shortages, particularly in agriculture and construction, due to their low-cost labor (Tasli-Karabulut & Sancak, 2024). Given that surplus value means the worker, in the process of production, creates more value than the value of their own labor-power (Marx, 1976), Turkish employees work approximately 48 hours per week in compliance with labor laws, Syrian refugees often work up to 60 hours, a clear violation of formal employment standards reflecting blatantly informal and exploitative labor conditions (Uygur et al., 2023).

Source: Getty Images
When it comes to legal status of Syrian refugees in Turkey, Syrian refugees derive their legal status from the Temporary Protection Regulation, stipulating that all Syrians who were forcibly displaced and arrived at or crossed Turkey’s borders are eligible for temporary protection (Ineli-Ciger, 2017). Since the legal framework of temporary protection granted to Syrians does not offer long- term residency or citizenship right, perpetuating uncertainty about their future (Güngördü-Saygi, 2024) many Syrians are obliged to live in these precarious conditions.
The Turkish government’s policy toward Syrian refugees reflects a duality. While President Erdoğan initially emphasized Turkey’s Islamic tradition of “Ansar”[1] hospitality, his administration later proposed a plan to repatriate one million Syrians before the 2023 elections. This ambivalence continued after Assad’s fall, with the Foreign Ministry announcing preparations for repatriation programs (YetkinReport, 2024), followed shortly by Erdoğan’s declaration that Syrians wishing to stay in Turkey could do so.
This study argues that, despite the public justification of refugee acceptance through Islamic solidarity, the government’s policies are driven by economic demands. The Turkish bourgeoisie’s reliance on cheap migrant labor in critical sectors demonstrate this dependency. Abdurrahman Baydemir, of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), warns that repatriation would disrupt key industries and raise labor costs (Patronlar telaşlı, 2024). Similarly, former Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu criticized businesses for exploiting Syrian workers while simultaneously demanding their removal (Soylu’dan göçmen açıklaması, 2022). As demonstrated, while the government publicly expresses refugee repatriation, also having concerns about labor market disruptions continue to influence its approach.
Methodology
Anti-refugee sentiment in Turkey has pressured policymakers to adopt repatriation rhetoric. To explore the violent manifestations of such hostility, this study incorporates fieldwork conducted in Kayseri, where anti-refugee riots erupted in 2024 and lasted three days. Interviews were conducted with S.M., a Syrian refugee living in Kayseri for over 15 years who experienced the attacks firsthand; Y.S., a Turkish teacher who has worked closely with refugees; and K.E., a local resident near the site of the violence. These observations and interviews shed light on public sentiment and the precarious living conditions of refugees.
Research
Field observations in Kayseri following the riots (30 June–3 July 2024), allegations of a Syrian man sexually assaulting a Syrian child, triggering violent anti-refugee protests reveal severe restrictions on refugees’ mobility and security. Many discovered their workplaces and vehicles vandalized—burned or shattered—when they ventured out during quieter morning hours. Evening outings were avoided entirely due to the persistent unrest near their homes.
Interviews conducted in Kayseri provide the background of conditions and aspirations of refugees following the fall of Assad. S.M., a Syrian refugee who experienced violence firsthand, acknowledges that while xenophobic attitudes persist, they have slightly diminished. He expresses a desire to return to Syria but cites ongoing instability and inadequate infrastructure as barriers. This leaves him grappling with maintaining an established livelihood in Turkey amidst racism and precarious working conditions, creating a profound dilemma for his family.

Y.S., a Turkish language teacher for refugees, highlights that most refugees are willing to return to Syria if their living conditions improve in Syria, noting their preference for a minimalistic lifestyle despite being aware of their exploitation as cheap labor. In contrast, K.E., a resident near the site of the riots, argues that only a small number of refugees would return due to a lack of confidence in Syria’s stability. She also critiques the Turkish government’s inconsistent policies, emphasizing the absence of a comprehensive integration framework despite initial efforts to welcome refugees. These insights unleash the essential policy steps to be taken by the government.
Source: Buket Didem Ulu

Source: Efe Göztak
Policy Recommendations & Implications
Extend Equal Labor Rights to Refugees
Refugees have been utilized as cheap labor to meet the demands of the capitalist class, as evidenced by data on their extended working hours. The formalization of employment conditions for refugees should be the first step toward addressing these issues. Contrary to statements made by the former Interior Minister of Turkey regarding refugee working conditions, refugees should be granted the same labor rights as native workers. This change would not only ensure equity but also pave the way for union membership, enabling refugees to collectively advocate for their rights. Moreover, such measures would constitute an essential step toward integrating those refugees who will remain in Turkey permanently. While these actions may not completely resolve the dilemmas refugees face, they have the potential to significantly mitigate their precarious working conditions and improve their overall quality of life.
Prevent irregular migration
Turkey has implemented an open-door policy for Syrian refugees since the onset of the civil war. This policy has facilitated both legal refugee applications and illegal crossings. While exploitation in various forms is already a pressing issue for legal refugee workers, those who enter illegally face an even higher risk of being exploited under precarious working conditions, compounded by the constant fear of deportation.Preventing new illegal crossings serves two critical purposes. Firstly, it curtails the ability of employers to exploit these individuals as cheap labor, thereby reducing labor inequalities and ensuring fairer conditions for all workers. Secondly, it addresses societal unrest by easing public concerns about unchecked migration, which often result in xenophobia and social tensions.
Curb Cross-Border Operations
Another crucial step in addressing the refugees’ plight and preventing potential newcomers is for the government to cease its military interventions. Before the fall of Assad, Turkey conducted several military operations in Syria, such as the “Olive Branch” and “Spring Peace”, often in collaboration with the Turkish-sponsored Syrian National Army and other Islamist armed groups (Manukyan & Hovsepyan, 2022). These interventions, aimed at countering perceived Kurdish threats and securing strategic interests, frequently resulted in significant displacement. For instance, the UNHCR reported that Turkey’s “Olive Branch” operation uprooted around 151,000 people from Afrin (Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Türkiye, 2018).
Despite Assad’s fall, Turkey continues to justify such interventions under the pretext of addressing border security concerns, exacerbating refugee influxes and subsequent crises. Ending these operations, whether through direct military engagement or proxy forces, is essential for stabilizing affected regions and addressing the root causes of displacement. A withdrawal of foreign troops would not only mitigate refugee flows but also allow Syrians to independently organize and determine their own future.
Implications
Implementing of these policies in an integrated way addresses to mitigate societal unease, annihilate ambivalent of government and refugees as well. As a influential actor in Syria, Turkey’s decision to cease military and diplomatic interventions and withdraw its troops would send a strong message to the international community, potentially compelling other interventionist states to follow suit. This strategy represents a critical first step toward stabilizing Syria, creating conditions that could make the repatriation process more feasible. As demonstrated in the figure 1, the initial period following Assad’s fall saw a decline in the number of refugees in Turkey. A more stabilized Syria is likely to encourage an increasing number of Syrians to plan for future repatriation.
Figure 1: Registered Syrian Refugees in Turkey by date

Source: UNHCR, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/113
Implementing a repatriation program after ceasing intervention in Syria can effectively reduce societal unrest. However, formalizing refugee labor is a crucial subsequent step to improve conditions for those remaining in Turkey. Integrating the remaining refugees through new regulations, particularly governing their working conditions, particularly working hours, can pave the way for eventual citizenship and eliminate existing ambivalence. Given that the repatriation of over 3 million refugees is unrealistic, a crucial prerequisite for integrating those who remain in Turkey is the legal formalization of their working conditions. This process will create a sense of equity among native workers and refugees, encouraging the perception that they belong to the same segment of society.
Additionally, maintaining the open-door policy, particularly regarding illegal crossings, exacerbates demographic challenges, promotes further exploitation, and leads increased xenophobic attacks. Preventing new illegal crossings is therefore essential to curb these issues and mitigate the exploitation of incoming refugees.Together, these measures can alleviate refugees’ precarious circumstances, creating opportunities for stability both in Turkey and Syria.
Conclusion
To sum up, addressing the challenges of Syrian refugees in Turkey requires considering all necessary actions to be taken by the government in their totality. Ceasing military interventions and withdrawing troops from Syria can contribute to stabilizing the region, encouraging repatriation, and reducing societal unrest. Domestically, formalizing refugee labor through equitable working regulations will improve living conditions and facilitate integration, while preventing new illegal crossings will mitigate exploitation and ease public concerns. These measures, implemented cohesively, can help eliminate the precarious conditions faced by refugees, resolve societal tensions, and provide a sustainable repatriation process for those willing to return to Syria.
Reference
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[1] In Islam, the word “Ansar” refers to the people who helped the Prophet Muhammad and his companions when they migrated to Medina
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